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Introduction
Important medical advances over the last several 
decades have vastly improved the technical capacity 
to control human pain. Millions of patients suffering 
from cancer, HIV/AIDS, and other conditions have 
been able to find relief from incapacitating chronic 
and acute pain. However, despite these developments, 
pain remains severely under treated worldwide, par-
ticularly in developing countries. The tragic conse-
quence is that for millions of people around the globe, 
excruciating pain is an inescapable reality of life. 
Medical availability of effective pain medication 
is undoubtedly one of the most neglected realms of 
global public health. Over the last few years, public 
and scholarly attention has centered on the impor-
tant issue of access to medicines, particularly in the 
context of HIV/AIDS antiretroviral therapy (ARV). 
Unfortunately, the global attention to ARV therapy 
has not stimulated broader attention to the universal 
issue of human pain that plagues millions of persons 
around the globe with terminal, chronic, and acute 
conditions. The lack of pain management options for 
marginalized populations is an enduring and expand-
ing global health calamity. 
The failure of national governments to prioritize 
access to opioid analgesics for pain, and the complex 
socioeconomic, cultural, and regulatory factors con-
tributing to the underutilization of pain medicine in 
developing countries, are widely documented.1 Nota-
bly, however, there has been no scholarly consider-
ation of the global drug regulatory environment or 
how international law and international institutions 
either interfere with or can contribute to national 
efforts to strengthen pain management. Opium is not 
only integral to the relief of individual pain, but it is 
also an internationally regulated substance under the 
1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs (Single Convention).2 
The goals of this article are twofold: (1) to critically 
analyze the impact of the international drug regula-
tory regime on medical availability of narcotic drugs 
and (2) to consider legal and institutional mechanisms 
that can be employed globally to promote wider acces-
sibility of these critical medicines. The United Nations 
international drug control regime, including the Single 
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Convention and the international organizations that 
support it, is traditionally understood to focus on the 
criminalization of drug abuse. It typically has not been 
regarded as a mechanism to provide a global frame-
work to advance medical availability of opioids. How-
ever, ensuring medical availability of narcotic drugs 
for medicinal purposes constitutes a key but neglected 
aim of the international legal regime. This article con-
tends that a more balanced approach to international 
implementation of the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs – one that weighs the Convention’s dual goals 
of controlling abuse and ensuring availability – can 
have an important, albeit limited, influence on states 
in encouraging medical availability of opioids.
Pain and Pain Management in Global 
Perspective
Today we have the knowledge to provide highly effec-
tive pain relief to improve the quality of life and con-
ditions of death for millions of people suffering from 
cancer, HIV/AIDS, chronic conditions, post-surgical 
pain, and other agonizing illnesses. Tragically, how-
ever, only a small percentage of the world’s population 
that could benefit from pain relief has access to such 
services. According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), 80 percent of persons worldwide suffering 
from severe pain do not receive adequate treatment.3 
Despite the global scale of the human suffering 
caused by lack of access to morphine and other opi-
oid analgesics, many countries have yet to recognize 
pain management as an important public health con-
cern. While morphine and other opioid analgesics are 
largely available in the United States, Western Europe, 
Australia, and New Zealand, they are in critically 
short supply in developing countries, newly industri-
alizing countries, and formerly socialist states.4 Poor 
countries, which comprise about 80 percent of the 
world’s population, account for only about six percent 
of global consumption of morphine.5 
WHO estimates that severe under treatment for pain 
is an acute problem in more than 160 countries world-
wide6 – countries in which the need for pain medicine 
is large and growing. Of the 57 million people who die 
annually, approximately six million deaths are from 
cancer and three million are from HIV/AIDS, with 
the majority of such deaths occurring in developing 
states.7 Notably, the majority of people lacking access 
to opioid analgesics have a heightened need for such 
medication because of a relative lack of access to cura-
tive or palliative care, such as surgery, chemotherapy, 
radiotherapy, or anti-retroviral drugs in poor states.8 
Millions of others suffering from moderate to severe 
pain from other causes, including chronic illnesses 
such as diabetes, heart disease, and lung disease, also 
receive no pain management. 
Pain control is designed to minimize physical dis-
comfort and allow patients to function normally. There 
are a number of different interventions for pain relief, 
including drugs and radiotherapy, as well as anes-
thetic, neurosurgical, psychological, and behavioral 
approaches. However, morphine and other opioid 
analgesics are the only effective analgesia for a wide 
variety of conditions, including cancer pain, chronic 
pain, diabetic neuropathy, HIV neuropathy, sickle cell 
disease, surgical pain, and traumatic pain.9 Morphine 
has also been recognized by WHO as an essential 
medicine since the elaboration of the first Model List 
of Essential Medicines in 1977.10 
The importance of opioids as analgesic medication 
for the management of moderate and severe pain is 
well understood. Significant advances in pharmacol-
ogy and technology over the last several decades have 
improved our capacity to control pain. Although the 
field of pain management is still evolving, the develop-
ment of well-crafted protocols has brought relief to the 
suffering of millions and allowed persons with termi-
nal illnesses to die in relative comfort.11 Opioid analge-
sics have been recognized by WHO as absolutely safe, 
effective, and essential for the management of cancer 
pain.12 Research has shown that WHO’s three-step 
model analgesic method for cancer pain relief is effec-
tive in 90 percent of cancer patients.13 
While morphine and other opioid analgesics are largely available in the United 
States, Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, they are in critically 
short supply in developing countries, newly industrializing countries, and 
formerly socialist states. Poor countries, which comprise about 80 percent  
of the world’s population, account for only about six percent  
of global consumption of morphine.
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In the future, the global need for pain medicine will 
increase rapidly. In developed and developing coun-
tries, the world’s population is aging, resulting in an 
increase of the prevalence of chronic, painful condi-
tions and cancer. By 2025, there will be 1.2 billion 
people over the age of 60, which is double the current 
estimate of 600 million.14 Future demand for such 
care is also expected to rise due to the dramatically 
expanding prevalence of HIV/AIDS in several parts of 
the world. Tragically, the greatest need for pain relief 
is increasingly concentrated in developing countries, 
where access to morphine and other opioid analgesics 
is inadequate or non-existent. For example, WHO esti-
mates that the burden of cancer will increasingly shift 
from industrialized countries to developing states, so 
that by the year 2020, 70 percent of the estimated 
20 million new cancer cases will occur in developing 
states.15 
In order to address the global challenge of man-
aging pain, vastly strengthened national and inter-
national action is necessary. In the absence of more 
effective approaches to pain management, WHO esti-
mates that 600 million people alive today will experi-
ence negative health impacts during their lifetime as a 
result of the inability to obtain access to effective pain 
medicine.16
National Challenges to Medical Availability 
Improving quality of life and the circumstances sur-
rounding death and dying through equitable access 
to pain management requires an appreciation of the 
multiple barriers that exist, nationally and interna-
tionally, to providing analgesics. At the national level, 
a number of complex socio-economic, cultural, ethi-
cal, and political factors coalesce to generate substan-
dard conditions for pain management.17 
In developing nations, pain management must be 
understood within the context of underlying condi-
tions of poverty and underdevelopment. Basic pain 
management must compete for scarce resources and 
political attention with other primary health care 
services as well as with other social concerns, such 
as education, food, and transportation.18 Poverty and 
underdevelopment affect both national health poli-
cies as well as individual access to pain services. In 
developing nations, opioid availability is typically lim-
ited to specialty centers; opioids are largely delivered 
parenterally to hospitalized patients, and dispensa-
tion is restricted to a select group of health care pro-
viders.19 Additionally, economic factors merge with 
demographic and geographical barriers to further 
obstruct availability of medicinal opium. For example, 
patients who cannot afford medication, or who are 
unable to travel to centers designated for treatment, 
are excluded from care. In many countries, over half of 
the population will never encounter a nurse or doctor 
in their lifetime.20
The economic, demographic, and geographical 
obstacles to pain management are compounded by 
the inflated costs of opioid analgesics in developing 
nations. Morphine is a low-cost, effective pain relief 
medicine ideally suited for poor countries. It is inex-
pensive to manufacture, costing approximately one 
American cent for each ten milligrams of generic 
morphine sulfate tabulate or morphine hydrochlo-
ride solution.21 Thus, unlike the global political battle 
over access to antiretroviral medicine for HIV/AIDS 
that has dominated public debates during this decade, 
patents and pricing should not be a major barrier to 
opioid availability. However, pharmaceutical compa-
nies often supply more expensive opioid formulations 
in developing countries, thus limiting their capacity 
to obtain cheap oral morphine.22 Ironically, research 
indicates that the cost of pain medication in devel-
oping countries exceeds the cost in industrialized 
states.23 
In addition to economic factors, cultural attitudes 
and knowledge barriers contribute to the under treat-
ment of severe pain.24 The notion that individual pain 
is a private matter to be endured without complaint 
is widely held.25 This attitude of silent suffering can 
be compounded by cultural and ethnic differences 
among patients and providers. These differences can 
create communication gaps and cultural barriers, 
which impede the recognition and treatment of severe 
pain. 
Furthermore, in many cultures, patients hold an 
irrational fear that opioid addiction will result from use 
during appropriate pain management. Research has 
soundly established that addiction is rare after using 
a powerful opioid analgesic for a legitimate medical 
purpose and that opioid analgesics are a core compo-
nent of good clinical practice. In short, the medical use 
of opioids does not create addicts, while undue limita-
tions on medical use of opioids hurts patients.26 How-
ever, the mistaken link between addiction and medical 
usage of opioid analgesics persists.
Similarly, a lack of training and basic education in 
the use of opioids has also created an irrational fear of 
addiction or misuse of opioid analgesics among health 
care professionals. This problem is found in both 
industrialized and developing countries and usually 
leads to the under treatment of pain.27 Consequently, it 
is widely recognized that integration of pain manage-
ment training in the undergraduate and continuing 
education of doctors, nurses, and other allied health 
professionals in nations worldwide is a critical factor 
in efforts to widen pain treatment worldwide.28 
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Perhaps the most important national barrier to the 
access to opioid analgesics is the absence of govern-
ment commitment, including the commitment to 
encourage or facilitate availability and appropriate 
education of health care professionals. In resource-
limited settings, medical availability of opioids is often 
considered a low clinical and political priority. Pain 
relief for the terminally, critically, and chronically ill 
must compete for limited resources against programs 
aimed at the prevention and treatment of disease in 
the young and healthy. Consequently, funds allotted 
for medical availability of opioids are often limited.29 
Many governments in developing countries do not 
recognize palliative care, including access to opioid 
analgesics to relieve suffering, as a national health care 
priority. The absence of political will to support effec-
tive pain management is evidenced by the fact that 
only a handful of poor countries have implemented 
WHO’s recommendation to adopt a national policy 
that integrates palliative care into the existing health 
system. In Africa, for example, Uganda was the only 
country in 2002 to prioritize palliative care, including 
access to pain medication for persons with HIV/AIDS 
and cancer, in its national health plan.30 
The absence of political will to support the availabil-
ity of pain relief medication is also evident in the over-
regulation of medicinal opium, an unremitting and 
critical problem that interferes with the availability of 
powerful analgesics in many poor countries.31 Govern-
ments worldwide hold a legitimate concern about the 
diversion of licit medicines into illegal channels. In 
many countries, however, the regulatory response has 
not been narrowly tailored to ensure that concerns of 
law enforcement do not unduly interfere with medi-
cal availability. As a consequence, opioid distribution 
is so tightly regulated that it can become too burden-
some or difficult for health care providers to offer their 
patients effective pain control. Overwhelming pre-
scription-filing requirements, inappropriate restric-
tions on the amount and duration of prescriptions, 
and other practices that interfere with clinical practice 
are common. For example, in India, a health facility 
planning on dispensing opioids must scale a number 
of cumbersome and time-consuming regulatory hur-
dles. It must obtain an opioid possession license, as 
well as government license forms for opioid purchase, 
transport, and import, in order to legally dispense it.32 
To further compound the difficulties of access, pre-
scriptions for oral morphine cannot, by law, be filled 
at commercial pharmacies. Only a limited number of 
tertiary and cancer hospitals hold such licenses, so that 
consequently, the vast majority of rural inhabitants in 
India do not have access to effective pain relief.33 In 
Kerala, an Indian state of over 30 million people, only 
three major health facilities dispense oral morphine.34 
Although much of the world’s supply of morphine 
comes from India, overregulation means that only a 
trickle of the production is made available to patients 
there.35
The failure of governments to prioritize access to 
opioid analgesics and the complex national socioeco-
nomic, cultural, and regulatory factors contributing to 
the underutilization of pain medicine in developing 
countries are widely understood. A number of orga-
nizations, including WHO and the Pain and Policy 
Studies Group, a WHO collaborating center, work 
with countries to improve the policy environment for 
treating patients with pain. In February 2007, WHO 
substantially increased its commitment to advance the 
medical availability of opioid analgesics by launching 
a new program designed to support national efforts in 
ensuring adequate availability of opioid analgesics for 
pain treatment for their populations.36 The new WHO 
Access to Controlled Medications Programme will 
work with states to address a number of the critical 
national factors that interfere with medical availabil-
ity. Among other things, this programme will include 
the following: (1) review of relevant national legisla-
tion and administrative procedures; (2) promotion 
of continuing medical education and rational use of 
controlled medications by health care professionals; 
and (3) assistance in ensuring an uninterrupted sup-
ply of opioid analgesics at affordable prices. Given the 
scope of the global public health concern, it is criti-
cal to enhance the technical and regulatory capacity 
of governments in order to advance medical availabil-
ity of opioid analgesics. Innovative and strengthened 
approaches to advance patient access to pain medicine 
are urgently needed.
The Impact of International Law and 
Institutions on the Medical Availability  
of Opioids
While important advances have been made in iden-
tifying the national regulatory factors that impede 
access to pain medication, the impact of the interna-
tional regulatory environment on medical availability 
of opioid analgesics, and the global mechanisms that 
can be adopted to promote national efforts to provide 
effective pain medicine, have thus far received limited 
scholarly and public attention. Morphine and other 
opioid analgesics are not only central to pain man-
agement, they are also controlled substances under a 
complex United Nations drug regulatory regime. As 
described herein, the regulatory scheme established 
by the United Nations drug control regime substan-
tially interferes with the capacity of states to broaden 
drug availability for legitimate public health purposes. 
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Reconceptualizing the drug control regime in a broader 
public health context may make an important contri-
bution to efforts to advance pain relief worldwide. 
The International Legal Framework for  
Narcotics Control
International drug control, including the control of 
opium, was one of the earliest fields of international 
cooperation. Crude opium has been available for 
thousands of years, but with the expansion of Brit-
ish opium trade in Asia in the 18th and 19th centu-
ries and the development of the hypodermic syringe 
in the late 1860s, the abuse of opioids rose dramati-
cally. By the late 19th century, global concern with 
opium consumption and trade reached a critical junc-
ture, which led to public and professional pressure 
to restrict medical access to opioids for pain relief. 
These circumstances provided the backdrop for the 
first international cooperative arrangements for drug 
control that began to emerge in the early part of the 
20th century.37 In 1909, the first International Opium 
Commission was convened in Shanghai, China, and it 
served as the platform for the first international legal 
instrument regulating psychoactive substances, the 
Hague Opium Convention of 1912. 
The multilateral drug control regime has evolved 
over the last hundred years into a highly complex regu-
latory morass involving multiple treaties and interna-
tional organizations. The scope of control over drugs 
has also broadened and deepened over time, both sub-
stantively and conceptually. Substantively, the list of 
drugs regulated has grown to include not just opium 
and cocaine, but also a range of newer psychotropic 
substances. Conceptually, the goals of the regime have 
shifted from an initial focus on the regulation and 
trade of drugs with legitimate medical purposes to a 
more recent emphasis on fostering multilateral coop-
eration to address the problems associated with licit 
and illicit drug abuse.38 
The key multilateral drug conventions in force 
today are the 1961 United Nations Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, the 1971 United Nations Conven-
tion on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 United 
Nations Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The cen-
terpiece of United Nations drug control regime, and 
of particular importance to the global availability of 
powerful opioid analgesics, is the Single Convention, 
which regulates narcotics including morphine and 
drugs with similar effects. The treaty regime has been 
remarkably influential in standardizing national drug 
laws, with some important exceptions, particularly in 
the realm of “harm reduction” efforts discussed below. 
As of 2005, 183 nations are party to the Single Con-
vention,39 while other states and territories that are 
not formally party to the instrument comply with its 
terms,40 leaving only a handful of states outside the 
reach of the global drug regulatory ambit. 
The twin aims of the Single Convention, as speci-
fied in its preamble and text, are to control the use and 
trafficking of substances with abuse potential while 
assuring the availability of these drugs for scientific 
and medical purposes. Assuring availability of drugs 
for scientific and medical purposes is of first impor-
tance in the text of the 1961 Single Convention.41 As 
described below, the Convention sets forth detailed 
obligations for State Parties and relevant interna-
tional organizations to limit exclusively to medical 
and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, 
export, import, distribution, trade, use, and posses-
sion of drugs in order to achieve the core aims of the 
instrument. 
The Single Convention emphasizes plant-based 
drugs such as opium, heroin, cannabis, and cocaine 
and classifies narcotic drugs according to their dan-
ger to health, risk of abuse, and therapeutic value. It 
establishes four schedules for controlled substances, 
with Schedule 1, applicable to morphine and drugs 
with similar effects and constituting the “standard 
regime of the Single Convention.”42 Schedule 1 con-
tains substances that are subject to all of the control 
provisions of the treaty. Key features of the Schedule 
1 treaty regime include the limitation to medical and 
scientific purposes of all phases of narcotics trade 
(manufacture, wholesale and retail domestic trade, 
and international trade) and of the possession and use 
of drugs. 
The Single Convention seeks to control illicit 
trade and abuse through stringent regulation of all 
phases of the supply of drugs. Government authori-
zation (licensing and state ownership) is mandatory 
for participation in any phase of narcotics trade, and 
each individual international transaction requires an 
export or import license. A centerpiece of the Single 
Convention is a global “estimates” system designed to 
limit the total quantities of drugs, whether produced 
domestically or imported, available in each country on 
an annual basis, to that needed for medical and sci-
entific purposes. The treaty also requires that every 
participant keep detailed records of all transactions 
in drugs and submit annual and quarterly statistical 
reports. 
A complex network of international organizations 
and agencies has the responsibility of implementing 
the treaty. Most importantly, Article 9 of the Single 
Convention establishes the International Narcotics 
Control Board (INCB) as the lead organ of the Single 
Convention regime with the authority to monitor and 
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promote the application of the Single Convention by 
State Parties.43 The 53-member Commission on Nar-
cotic Drugs (CND) – the central drug policy making 
body in the United Nations system that is an organ 
of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – has 
specific authority pursuant to the Single Convention 
to add, remove, and transfer drugs among the treaty’s 
four schedules of controlled substances. Any changes 
by the CND to drug scheduling under the Single Con-
vention must be made in accordance with the findings 
and the recommendations of WHO. The CND may 
also make recommendations to the INCB and non-
parties in order to promote the implementation of the 
Single Convention. Finally, the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), of which the INCB’s 
Secretariat is a part, is charged with the day-to-day 
responsibility of monitoring national compliance with 
the treaty.
Public Health and the Prohibitionist Bias of the 
Global Drug Control Regime 
The international institutions that have collective 
responsibility to implement the aims of the Single 
Convention, the CND, the INCB, and UNODOC, 
have emphasized a strict drug prohibitionist and 
law enforcement approach to treaty interpretation 
and application in an to effort bolster global action 
to counter the extraordinary challenge of drug abuse 
worldwide. The sheer size of the global public health 
burden caused by drug trafficking and consumption is 
daunting. Illicit drugs alone are estimated to be one of 
the world’s largest trading sectors. At $400-$500 bil-
lion per year, illicit trafficking in narcotics constitutes 
nearly ten percent of world trade and is larger than 
the automobile market.44 The United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime estimates that heroin is abused in 
three-fourths of all countries, and cocaine is abused in 
two-thirds.45 Drug trafficking has been linked to ter-
rorism and organized crime, and drug-related prob-
lems include increased rates of crime and violence, 
susceptibility to HIV/AIDS and hepatitis, and a break-
down in social behavior.46 
Countering the global burden of drug abuse and 
trafficking is an extraordinary global public health 
challenge. However, the operation of the international 
narcotics regime and, in particular, the strict prohi-
bitionist approach of the international institutions 
charged with implementing the aims of the Single 
Convention, have been subject to a multiplicity of 
criticisms. Numerous commentators, for example, 
emphasize that the law enforcement approach to drug 
abuse has, in fact, failed to curb abuse and illicit traf-
ficking.47 Illicit drug abuse was a public health concern 
in about 20 to 30 states when the Single Convention 
was adopted in 1961. Today, 46 years after the adop-
tion of the treaty and the establishment of the contem-
porary regime for global control, illicit drug abuse has 
skyrocketed worldwide, with the total number of drug 
abusers between the ages of 15 and 64 estimated to be 
around 200 million.48 
Critics of the global drug control regime also posit 
that the traditional criminal justice approach to drug 
control (emphasized by the United Nations agencies) 
is at odds with the contemporary public health prac-
tice aimed at reducing drug abuse and its adverse con-
sequences. In particular, observers argue that focus-
ing the principal goal of drug policy on prohibition has 
diverted attention away from treatment and towards 
punishment. Countries such as Brazil, Canada, New 
Zealand, Australia, and member states of the European 
Union increasingly favor a “harm reduction” approach 
to drug abuse, including the use of injecting rooms, 
needle/syringe exchange programs, individual posses-
sion of cannabis for medical purposes, and substitu-
tion or maintenance treatment. However, the shift in 
priorities to “harm reduction” is increasingly seen by 
the INCB as covertly undermining prohibition. The 
polarized debate between the INCB, with its prohibi-
tionist, criminalization perspective, and those govern-
ments wishing to pursue a “harm reduction” approach 
to drug control, is aired yearly at the annual meeting 
of the INCB.49 Although State Parties argue that such 
practices are consistent with the international law, the 
INCB, in its annual report, frequently criticizes such 
public health practices as conflicting with the letter 
and the spirit of the Single Convention.50
Although it has received highly limited public and 
media attention, the strict criminal justice approach 
to treaty interpretation and application advanced by 
the global drug agencies also impinges significantly 
on the legal and political capacity of states to ensure 
access to pain medication for legitimate medical pur-
poses. As described above, enhancing medical avail-
ability of opioids is one of the twin goals of the Single 
Convention along with the control of drug abuse. The 
preamble of the Single Convention recognizes that “the 
medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be indis-
pensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that 
adequate provision must be made to ensure the avail-
ability of narcotic drugs for such purposes.”51 Medical 
availability of controlled substances is also a general 
obligation of the State Parties. Article 4(c) provides 
that Parties shall undertake legislative and adminis-
trative measures to “limit exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes the production, manufacture, 
export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and pos-
session of drugs.”52 Medical availability of morphine 
and other opioid analgesics is, therefore, a cardinal 
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aim of the Single Convention and a core obligation of 
the Parties.
Implementing the aims of the Single Convention, 
including ensuring medical availability of morphine 
and other opioid analgesics, is a principal responsibil-
ity of the INCB. The INCB is mandated pursuant to 
Article 9(4) to cooperate with State Parties to “limit 
the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of 
drugs to an adequate amount required for scientific 
and medical purposes, to ensure their availability for 
such purposes and to prevent illicit cultivation, pro-
duction, and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in 
and use of, drugs.”53 (Emphasis added.) The INCB has, 
in fact, undertaken studies and surveys on medical 
availability54 and, in its annual reports, the INCB has 
generally called upon nations to revise restrictive laws 
that interfere with opioid availability for medical pur-
poses and that are in excess of the Single Convention’s 
requirements. 
Despite its rhetorical commitment to medical avail-
ability, in its operational activities and programmes, 
the INCB, along with the Secretariat that supports 
its work, views its mission as primarily one of law 
enforcement and drug control. Concerned that legiti-
mate medicines can be diverted into illicit channels, 
the INCB has prioritized strict regulation of opioid 
analgesics in policy and practice. This has, concomi-
tantly, relegated issues of medical availability to sec-
ondary consideration. Consequently, the INCB has 
not advanced any interpretation or application of the 
Single Convention in a manner that fulfills its obliga-
tion of advancing worldwide access to drugs for legiti-
mate medical purposes. 
Lessons from the Scheduling of Narcotic Drugs under 
the Single Convention: A Case Study of the Neglect of 
Medical Availability in International Practice
The most notable examples of the INCB’s prohibition-
ist bias negatively impacting legitimate availability of 
pain medication for populations worldwide involve the 
scheduling of narcotics under the Single Convention. 
Pursuant to Article 3, the Single Convention estab-
lishes a unique and expeditious international legal 
process for adding a substance or changing the status 
of a substance under the treaty’s four schedules with-
out requiring a formal amendment to the Convention. 
First, the Single Convention authorizes WHO to con-
duct a medical and scientific review of a substance and 
to make a scheduling recommendation to the Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs. Second, the CND has the 
final decision to schedule the substance, but may do so 
only in accordance with the schedule recommended 
by WHO. This two-part review and scheduling process 
affects the controls that will be placed on medicines in 
each country pursuant to the Single Convention. As 
the Single Convention is widely adhered to, the sched-
uling decisions are of tremendous importance to the 
accessibility of drugs.
The scheduling process, including the rescheduling 
of substances already under international control, can 
have a substantial and unintended negative impact on 
medical availability of drugs worldwide.55 The regu-
latory requirements for drugs that are scheduled or 
rescheduled under the Single Convention can be tre-
mendously burdensome and, at times, can outstrip 
the capacity of poor countries. Instituting the complex 
and extensive regulatory requirements mandated by 
the Single Convention for a scheduled substance is 
not a simple or perfunctory undertaking. Drafting 
and implementing effective national drug regulation 
necessitates technical skill as well as legal, financial, 
and technical capacity. It is widely appreciated that 
because of the regulatory burden imposed by the Sin-
gle Convention, many poor states simply ban a medi-
cine that may have important public health purposes 
when the substance is scheduled or rescheduled. Con-
sequently, it is critically important to ensuring medi-
cal availability of legitimate medicines that scheduling 
decisions are based on solid medical, scientific, and 
public health information.
Concerned that legitimate medicines can be diverted into illicit channels, the 
International Narcotics Control Board has prioritized strict regulation  
of opioid analgesics in policy and practice. This has, concomitantly, relegated 
issues of medical availability to secondary consideration. Consequently, the 
INCB has not advanced any interpretation or application of the  
Single Convention in a manner that fulfills its obligation of advancing 
worldwide access to drugs for legitimate medical purposes.
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In a number of recent cases involving scheduling or 
rescheduling under the Single Convention, the INCB 
and its Secretariat have promoted the interpretation 
and application of the treaty in a manner that reflects 
not only their overriding concern with law enforce-
ment and drug diversion, but also neglect for medi-
cal availability considerations. One such case is the 
recent controversy involving the medical availability 
of ketamine a commonly used and essential analgesic 
in many states. In its 2006 annual report, the INCB 
urged countries to gather information on the abuse 
of ketamine, in order to assist WHO in considering 
scheduling the medication for tighter control.56 Con-
cerned with the possible diversion of this medicine 
into illicit channels, the INCB also urged national 
governments reporting ketamine abuse to add the 
medicine to their national lists of controlled sub-
stances.57 The INCB took this action despite having, 
as described above, no legal jurisdiction in the sched-
uling process and knowing that scheduling can have 
a severe negative impact upon availability for legiti-
mate medical purposes. 
At the 2007 annual meeting of the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the WHO representative 
stated that he was “astonished” by the INCB’s “heart-
less” call to states to schedule the essential medicine.58 
WHO has the sole responsibility to conduct the medi-
cal and scientific evaluation of drugs and make rec-
ommendations on their scheduling to the CND. In 
March 2006, a WHO Expert Panel on Drug Depen-
dence formally evaluated ketamine and did not rec-
ommend scheduling the substance.59 According to 
WHO, in resource-poor settings, ketamine can be the 
only substance available for anesthesia. Populations 
of many developing countries crucially depend upon 
access to ketamine for surgery, and the medication 
is part of WHO Guidelines for surgery in health care 
settings with limited technical resources. Given that 
many countries simply ban a medication subject to 
scheduling or rescheduling, the INCB’s unauthorized 
and ill-considered call on states to schedule ketamine, 
based upon the mere possibility of abuse and without 
credible medical and scientific evidence, means that 
many patients in developing countries will not have 
access to surgery or will have to undergo surgery fully 
conscious. Notably, in the 2007 CND annual report, 
the controversy surrounding ketamine and WHO’s 
striking intervention was not even mentioned.60 
The case of ketamine is an important example of 
how greatly exaggerated concerns about drug diver-
sion have led global drug regulatory authorities to 
advance drug scheduling decisions with severe public 
health consequences, without appropriately weigh-
ing the impact of scheduling on the legitimate medi-
cal availability of a critical medicine. There are other 
such examples of the INCB’s prohibitionist bias in 
the scheduling process, including buprenorphine, an 
important analgesic in many developing countries.61 
The case of ketamine is also an important example 
of how greatly exaggerated concerns about drug diver-
sion have led the INCB to seek to undermine the legit-
imate legal authority of WHO to make independent 
scheduling recommendations to the CND.
As described above, WHO has the sole responsibil-
ity to conduct the medical and scientific evaluation of 
drugs and make recommendations to the CND con-
cerning the level of international control to be applied. 
Under the Single Convention, WHO has an estab-
lished review process for scheduling recommenda-
tions in which an Expert Committee on Drug Depen-
dence (WHO Expert Committee) evaluates substances 
for international control recommendations, pursuant 
to WHO Guidelines for the WHO Review of Depen-
dence Producing Substances for International Control 
(Scheduling Guidelines).62 Following the substantive 
and procedural requirements set forth in the Guide-
lines, the WHO Expert Committee makes a schedul-
ing recommendation to the WHO Director-General, 
who has final authority to make a scheduling recom-
mendation to the CND. 
 Pursuant to the Single Convention and its constitu-
tional mandate, WHO has broad authority to consider 
all relevant scientific and public health considerations 
when making a drug scheduling and rescheduling rec-
ommendation, including liability for abuse and medi-
cal availability. The Official Commentary to the Single 
Convention indicates that the impact of scheduling 
narcotics on medical availability should be an impor-
tant and appropriate consideration during the WHO 
scientific review process. The Official Commentary 
to Single Convention Article 3, the treaty provision 
that addresses changes in the scope of control of sub-
stances, provides that WHO has “wide discretion” in 
the scheduling process and should be “guided in this 
choice by the interests of public health in each case, as 
it appears not only from the degree of danger which 
the substance in question presents but also from the 
need to make useful medicines as easily available as 
may be compatible with the requirements of their con-
trol.”63 The WHO scientific review process established 
under the Single Convention is designed to permit 
a rigorous and evidence-based evaluation of medi-
cines that balances risks of abuse against the benefits 
obtained through legitimate use. The scientific and 
public health approach to drug scheduling recom-
mendations undertaken as part of the WHO review 
process, the first step in the scheduling process, also 
provides a critical counterpoint and public health bal-
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ance to the more politicized forum of the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs.
The INCB’s efforts to focus the scheduling process 
exclusively upon questions of abuse by, among other 
things, undermining the legal authority and responsi-
bility of WHO to provide an evidence-based analysis 
for drug-scheduling recommendations raise impor-
tant concerns. The INCB Secretariat’s apparent per-
spective that the impact of drug scheduling on medi-
cal availability should not be a central consideration 
in the scheduling process is inconsistent with the text 
of the Single Convention. Furthermore, as in the case 
of ketamine, the INCB’s single-minded prohibition-
ist perspective could result in the placement of inap-
propriate controls on legitimate medicines. Far from 
solving a public health problem, the prohibitionist 
bias of INCB and the other drug regulatory agencies is 
preventing legitimate patients from being prescribed 
medication that they desperately need.
Achieving Balance in Global Regulatory 
Drug Policy
In their efforts to fight global drug trafficking and 
abuse, the international drug regulatory agencies have 
adopted a narrow view of the public health objective 
of global drug control. Consistent with the twin aims 
of the Single Convention, public health in the drug 
regulatory context is appropriately understood in a 
broader context as encompassing efforts that both 
guarantee legitimate access to pain medication for 
patients in need as well as control abuse and diver-
sion. Reconceptualizing the drug control regime and 
realigning the efforts of drug regulatory organs to this 
public health perspective may make an important con-
tribution to efforts to advance pain relief worldwide. 
In 1998, WHO, in cooperation with its collaborating 
center at the University of Wisconsin, elaborated the 
concept of the “Central Principle of Balance” in order 
to guide the development of national drug regulatory 
policies pursuant to the Single Convention.64 Accord-
ing to WHO, “The Central Principle of Balance” repre-
sents the dual imperative of preventing the abuse, traf-
ficking, and diversion of narcotic drugs while, at the 
same time, ensuring medical availability. As stated by 
WHO, “When misused, opioids pose a threat to soci-
ety; a system of control is necessary to prevent abuse, 
trafficking, and diversion, but the system of control 
is not intended to diminish the medical usefulness of 
opioids, nor interfere in their legitimate medical uses 
and patient care.”65 
The concept of the Central Principle of Balance 
should not be limited to national regulatory policies, 
but should also guide the development and imple-
mentation of international drug control policies. This 
article has illustrated that the current worldwide sys-
tem for drug control poses important risks to global 
public health. In addition, the prohibitionist bias of 
the international drug regulatory agencies may also 
undermine the goal of drug control by exacerbating 
the problem of the diversion of licit medicine into ille-
gal channels. 
As a general matter, the risk of diversion of licit med-
icines into illegal traffic has not traditionally been one 
of the most critical challenges in international drug 
control. Although the global drug regime has been sin-
gularly unsuccessful in curbing abuse of illicit drugs, it 
has been remarkably effective in curbing production 
and diversion of licit narcotic drugs,66 particularly 
opioid-based analgesics. The United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime estimates that global opium pro-
duction today is 80 percent of what it was almost 100 
years ago.67 As late as 2006, there were no cases of the 
diversion of narcotic drugs from licit to illicit interna-
tional trade.68 
Recently, however, the INCB has reported an increas-
ing problem of the diversion of licit opioid analgesics 
in domestic markets, particularly in the United States 
and Canada.69 The Board has recognized that overly 
stringent national drug control regulations, such as 
complex prescription requirements, can obstruct the 
Although not technically binding, the increasing number of intergovernmental 
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and other international forums 
reflects the world community’s growing recognition of the critical link between 
access to essential medications and human rights. The specific reference  
to the link between palliative care and human rights may reflect the 
community’s emerging recognition that allowing millions to suffer  
preventable excruciating pain is an affront to human dignity.
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capacity of legitimate patients to get essential pain 
relief. This, in turn, is contributing to the growth of 
the unregulated market in licit medicines since des-
perate patients turn to illicit channels to obtain pain 
relief that they cannot obtain through legal sources. 
To the extent that the operation of the international 
control regime contributes to the problem of excessive 
national drug regulation, as in the case of the sched-
uling of analgesics described above, the efforts of the 
global drug control agencies may, in fact, be contrib-
uting to the growing problem of the diversion of licit 
medication.
Using the Central Principle of Balance to advance 
the dual purposes of the Single Convention is con-
sistent with international human rights law. Access 
to essential medicines, including pain medicine, is 
receiving increasing recognition in the practice and 
praxis of international human rights law. In the con-
text of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
and malaria, the United Nations General Assembly 
in 2004 adopted a resolution recognizing that access 
to medication is a “fundamental element for achiev-
ing progressively the full realization of the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health.”70 In this reso-
lution, the General Assembly specifically identified a 
link between pain medicine and human rights when 
it called upon states to adopt legislation to safeguard 
and promote effective access to “preventative, curative 
or palliative pharmaceutical products.”71 (Emphasis 
added.) A similar resolution was adopted in the Com-
mission on Human Rights.72 Although not technically 
binding, the increasing number of intergovernmen-
tal resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and 
other international forums reflects the world commu-
nity’s growing recognition of the critical link between 
access to essential medications and human rights. 
The specific reference to the link between palliative 
care and human rights may reflect the community’s 
emerging recognition that allowing millions to suffer 
preventable excruciating pain is an affront to human 
dignity.
Rethinking the Single Convention: Advancing Access 
to Pain Medication through the Implementation of 
International Law
This article has illustrated that advancing public health 
and protecting human rights in the international drug 
regulatory context requires policymakers to elaborate 
a new and more balanced approach to global drug 
control. In particular, this new approach to imple-
mentation must depart from the strict prohibition-
ist approach that dominates the agenda of the global 
drug regulatory authorities today. Policymakers must 
articulate a comprehensive and holistic approach to 
drug control that balances the dual aims of the Single 
Convention: preventing abuse and ensuring medical 
availability. 
Reconceptualizing implementation of the Single 
Convention to achieve greater balance in global drug 
policy can make an important contribution towards 
increasing access to pain medications. The INCB, and 
the Secretariat that supports its work, are of particu-
lar importance if more effective implementation of the 
treaty is to be achieved. The INCB, in particular, exists 
to promote governments’ application of drug treaty 
provisions.
Research over the last decade and a half by schol-
ars of international relations and international law 
clearly evidences that international institutions can 
produce dramatic changes in the behavior of the states 
and non-states that they seek to influence.73 In other 
words, international organizations, through the opera-
tion of treaty provisions, can help make treaties work. 
The INCB can undertake a number of steps pursuant 
to the Single Convention to encourage and assist State 
Parties in strengthening access to medicines. Most 
importantly, the INCB can advance an interpretation 
of the scheduling process that supports legitimate 
medical access to opioid analgesics. More generally, 
the INCB can encourage states to strengthen national 
medical availability policies by utilizing its legal 
authority to monitor and implement the dual aims of 
the Convention.
It is widely appreciated that supervision of national 
compliance with international norms by international 
institutions can help promote rule compliance by 
states. International institutions can promote national 
implementation of international obligations by 
enabling states to be held accountable to other states 
and, at times, the wider public, thereby exercising a 
form of collective community supervision.74 Interna-
tional monitoring and supervision of compliance with 
state obligations is of primary importance to interna-
tional treaty implementation in a wide range of fields, 
including the environment, human rights, and arms 
control.75 In contrast, the absence of any provision for 
institutional review has often been recognized as a 
sign that a treaty is ineffective and at risk of becoming 
obsolete.76 
The Single Convention incorporates several rigor-
ous international supervisory and non-compliance 
mechanisms to promote national implementation 
consistent with the aims of the Convention. Notably, 
these mechanisms have been widely used by the INCB 
to monitor national efforts to prevent drug abuse and 
trafficking, as well as to critique “harm reduction” pol-
icies favored by some states. However, the procedures 
566	 journal	of	law,	medicine	&	ethics
SYMPOSIUM
have not been employed to monitor and promote state 
action on medical availability.
Consistent with contemporary treaty practice, the 
Single Convention incorporates a reporting mecha-
nism. Most treaties today require State Parties to make 
periodic reports on matters affecting the treaty. While 
the extent of the obligation varies, reporting proce-
dures generally require State Parties to submit national 
reports on the measures that they have adopted and 
the headway that has been made in implementing a 
treaty. Pursuant to Article 18 of the Single Convention, 
State Parties are required to provide such an annual 
report. Parties, pursuant to Article 19, are also legally 
obligated to submit other information to the Board, 
including estimates of drug requirements and a host 
of statistical information on the production, manufac-
ture, use, imports, and exports of drugs. 
The Board has broad authority to engage in a dia-
logue with states on the consistency of the measures 
reported, as related to the objectives of the Single 
Convention. It is also authorized to publicly disclose 
state activity and to critically analyze such measures 
in the annual INCB report or in other reports. Article 
15 of the Single Convention empowers the INCB to 
include in its reports “an analysis of the estimates and 
statistical information at its disposal and, in appropri-
ate cases, an account of the explanations if any, given 
by or required of Governments, together with any 
observations and recommendations which the Board 
desires to make.”77 Pursuant to its mandate under the 
drug control treaties, the Board also regularly selects 
several countries for review, with the goal of analyz-
ing their overall compliance with the provisions of the 
drug control conventions. The findings of the review, 
as well as the Board’s recommendation for remedial 
action, are conveyed to the State Parties individu-
ally and are generally discussed in the annual INCB 
report. 
Periodic reporting of states’ performance can be an 
important mechanism in assisting states to identify 
and alleviate obstacles when implementing interna-
tional commitments.78 Reporting functions can thus 
help to raise domestic bureaucratic conscience about 
treaty obligations. This regular review can provide the 
basis for the elaboration of clearly stated and targeted 
policies. Periodic review can also expand the commu-
nity of interest by facilitating public scrutiny of gov-
ernmental policy. Consequently, a periodic review pro-
cess can generate domestic pressure to comply with a 
treaty’s terms. In addition, a monitoring process can 
open a dialogue between national officials and the 
monitoring organization, thereby helping states to 
understand the requirements of the treaty and to pro-
actively identify domestic difficulties with compliance. 
Finally, a reporting process can assist State Parties in 
implementing international obligations by triggering 
international assistance to solve domestic problems 
identified during the reporting process. 
In implementing the periodic reporting procedure, 
the INCB has established a highly effective reporting 
process with stringent critical review of national con-
duct. The INCB achieves almost universal reporting 
compliance by State Parties and non-parties because 
the manufacture, import, export, and medical use of 
opioids are determined by the Board through the esti-
mates system. Additionally, compliance with the insti-
tutional reporting process is enhanced because con-
trol of illicit narcotics is high on the criminal justice 
and political agendas of states.79 However, though the 
INCB has utilized the reporting process to advance 
provisions of the treaty related to drug abuse and 
trafficking, the Board has not generally sought to use 
the uniquely effective reporting process to encourage 
states to fulfill their treaty obligation to ensure medi-
cal availability of opioid analgesics. 
In order to advance implementation of drug con-
trol and trafficking under the Single Convention, the 
INCB also conducts periodic missions to State Parties 
in order to review the national drug control situation. 
The INCB reports the results of its inspections and 
recommendations made to states in its annual report, 
and about 20 such missions are conducted annually. 
Inspections to verify treaty compliance are generally 
considered the strongest method of information gath-
ering and supervision in the international system and 
can be a powerful means to encourage rule compli-
ance.80 The strongest examples of inspection by inter-
national agencies are in arms control. The inspec-
tion regime can be used to promote public health by 
encouraging states to implement their treaty commit-
ments on medical availability. However, as in the case 
of the periodic reporting mechanisms, the inspection 
procedure has not generally been conceived of or used 
as a tool to advance equitable access to desperately 
needed pain medication.
The Single Convention also incorporates a potent 
non-compliance procedure designed to secure con-
formity with the terms of the treaty. Non-compliance 
procedures are generally an extension of the infor-
mation gathering, monitoring, and supervision pro-
cesses, as they represent a stronger means of inducing 
states to comply.81 Non-compliance procedures can be 
understood as a soft form of dispute settlement that 
can pressure errant states into rule compliance. Arti-
cle 14 of the Single Convention incorporates a range 
of assertive mechanisms in order to encourage non-
compliant states to meet their obligations under the 
Single Convention. First, the INCB has the power to 
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propose consultations, request explanations, and rec-
ommend that a government modify its policies if the 
Board has objective reason to believe that the “aims 
of this Convention are being seriously endangered by 
reason of the failure of any Party, country or territory 
to carry out the provisions of this Convention.”82 The 
Board can also, at its discretion, request an inspection 
in the territory to assess national policies.
If the INCB finds that a government has failed to 
furnish satisfactory explanations or adopt remedial 
recommendations suggested by the Board, or if there 
is a serious situation that needs international coop-
erative action, then it can widely publicize the non-
compliance. In particular, the INCB can put national 
behavior under a spotlight by alerting the Parties, 
the Commission on Narcotic Drug, and the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council. The Board also 
has the right to publish a report on the matter.83
The Single Convention Article 14 non-compliance 
procedure could be a powerful tool for encouraging 
countries to effectively advance the treaty’s objective 
of medical availability. The idea of utilizing the non-
compliance procedure in cases where countries have 
not fulfilled their obligation to make essential medi-
cines available may seem farfetched, but it is a reason-
able and appropriate interpretation of the text of the 
provision. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, the treaty on treaties, sets forth that 
a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of 
their object and purpose.”84 The context referred to 
means the treaty’s preamble and annexes. Notably, 
Article 14.1.a. of the Single Convention provides that 
the non-compliance measures are triggered when the 
Board believes that the “aims” of the Convention are 
seriously endangered. As medical availability is one 
of the two core aims of the Convention established by 
the preamble and Article 4, the ordinary meaning of 
the language and the context of the treaty supports the 
interpretation.85 Clearly, the initiation of an Article 14 
procedure is a very serious matter, and not all cases 
justify the imposition of this process. There could be 
cases requiring the procedure, however, such as when 
a country has consistently neglected to address the 
issue of pain relief and has failed to furnish the Board 
with any reasonable explanation. 
Importantly, the mere threat of an Article 14 pro-
cedure by the INCB may induce governments to take 
corrective action and strengthen medical availability. 
Even if the government is not directly pressured by the 
threat of an Article 14 procedure, in democratic soci-
eties, the public and the media may exercise pressure 
for compliance. Unfortunately, as with both reporting 
and inspections procedures, the Board has neglected 
to use the non-compliance procedure of Article 14 to 
induce national action to ensure opioid medication for 
patients in need. Notably, the INCB has never utilized 
the Article 14 non-compliance procedure in a case of 
medical availability.86 
Collectively, the reporting, inspection, and non-
compliance procedures established under the Sin-
gle Convention could be important mechanisms in 
encouraging countries to honor their legal obligation 
to expand medical availability of critical medicines. 
Interestingly, the Single Convention stands apart from 
many treaties with a strong public health component 
because of the potential strength of these procedures. 
Powerful implementation mechanisms, particularly 
non-compliance and inspection procedures, are fairly 
uncommon in the international system and rare in 
treaties with a significant public health component. 
The Single Convention inspection regime was estab-
lished because of the strong linkage between crimi-
nal justice and drug abuse. The INCB’s failure to use 
these procedures is contrary to the letter and spirit of 
the Single Convention and is a wasted opportunity in 
making an important impact on the global challenge 
of needless human pain.
Of course, monitoring and implementation are not 
the only international institutional mechanisms to 
support treaty adherence by State Parties. A variety of 
national factors account for compliance with interna-
tional obligations, and not all violations are premedi-
tated or purposeful. As a general matter, it is widely 
recognized that the failure of states to implement 
international commitments into national law and pol-
icy may reflect, to some degree, a limitation of capacity 
or capability, and not a lack of political will.87 
This is certainly the case with medical availability 
of powerful analgesics. As described above, a lack of 
technical, legal, and bureaucratic capacity character-
izes the drug regulatory framework in many countries 
and significantly obstructs advancing the availability 
of narcotics for pain relief. Working with WHO on 
its new Access to Controlled Medicines Programme 
could greatly assist states in meeting their legal obli-
gation to ensure medical availability of opioids. The 
INCB and WHO could provide technical assistance to 
states in implementing standards on access to opioid 
medications, including strengthening national capac-
ity to meet the regulatory requirements of the esti-
mates system.88
Elements from other global regimes can also pro-
vide guidance in strengthening the implementation 
of the Single Convention to advance medical avail-
ability of essential pain medications. One critical area 
for strengthened national and international action 
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is the financing and supply of opioid analgesics. As 
described above, one of the key obstacles to pain con-
trol in developing countries is the lack of availabil-
ity of cheap, generic forms of morphine. Innovative 
approaches for addressing this public health dilemma 
are urgently needed. One possible approach would 
involve the collaboration of the INCB, UNODOC, and 
WHO to establish a global financing mechanism that 
would advance the universal availability of inexpen-
sive generic forms of morphine. By using its purchas-
ing power while carefully regulating availability and 
quality assurance, the INCB could solve one of the key 
obstacles to drug availability in poor states. 
As the lead institution of the global drug regulatory 
regime, the INCB has an express legal obligation to 
advance the aim of the Single Convention in ensuring 
medical availability. By utilizing the reporting, inspec-
tion, and non-compliance mechanisms incorporated 
in the treaty, and by encouraging effective collabora-
tions between UNODOC and WHO in providing tech-
nical and financial support to poor states, the INCB 
could make an unparalleled contribution to advancing 
universal availability of opioid medications. By work-
ing effectively with governments on this critical public 
health and human rights concern, the INCB may be 
able to address and alleviate the lack of national politi-
cal commitment to effective pain control. The devel-
opment of new national laws and policies on pain 
control may also, over time, contribute to a broadened 
understanding and acceptability of medicinal pain 
control among domestic populations. In other words, 
international action could trigger the implementation 
of national laws and policies that may contribute to 
expanding knowledge about pain medicine among 
patients and providers. This process can help to create 
a social climate in which pain relief is not only socially 
acceptable, but also universally recognized as an inte-
gral component of good clinical practice. 
Conclusion
Today we have the knowledge and the experience to 
control pain and significantly diminish human suffer-
ing. The tragedy is that for most of the world’s popula-
tion effective pain control is entirely unavailable. Pain 
control is inexpensive, cost effective, and can be inte-
grated into resource-poor settings. Yet the access gap 
between rich and poor countries continues to widen. 
The global public health and human rights challenge 
is to expand awareness and action, nationally and 
internationally, and to ensure equitable access to good 
pain control for all legitimate patients.
This paper has recommended an alternative 
approach to international drug control – one that is 
consistent with the Single Convention and that seeks 
to balance control of abuse with medical availability. 
Ultimately, political commitment, particularly among 
major donors to U.N. drug control efforts, will be 
the most essential component of a new drug control 
regime. Rethinking the Single Convention requires 
collective action by a group of countries with a shared 
reform agenda. Even with political support from key 
states, the complexity of the issues surrounding the 
pain matrix means that there is no magic policy pill 
that can ensure effective medical availability of opi-
oids. However, national and international policies 
that balance concern of abuse and medical availability 
are critical components of advancing pain treatment 
worldwide. 
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